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Going Glocal in a Pandemic: Can Japan Offer
Lessons for Others?
Searching for Lessons from Japan Glocal
The COVID-19 pandemic attacked the worldwide economy. While the
long-term effects of the pandemic are still unpredictable, leaders in most
countries have begun to look for ways of rebuilding their damaged
economies. One possible way to revive the damaged economies is not
only to mitigate lockdowns and allow retail and restaurant operations
domestically, but also to reopen the borders and restart international
economic activities. Several EU countries began to accept travelers
from the 27 EU countries and other Schengen countries. Of course, as
new waves of the pandemic emerged in various countries, the policies of
keeping borders open or closed kept changing, often abruptly.
In this situation, the leaders try to learn which countries have managed
the pandemic well in order to contain it. Till the end of June 2020 (the first
wave of the pandemic), Japan was one of the countries which managed
well in terms of minimizing the impacts of this pandemic (Harding 2020;
Saito 2020). Even after the third wave had come in November and
December 2020, The Economist (2021) focused on global
overestimation or underestimation of pandemic deaths. According to this
report, the death count in most countries was extremely underestimated.
The Economist estimated that actual deaths in many countries were
twice to four times the reported numbers. The worst country – according
to this report – was Russia. The report applauded Japan's achievement,
where it seems deaths were over-reported by 30,000; i.e., actual deaths
were fewer than what was reported.
Japan coped with this pandemic with extremely low number of
PCR (polymerase chain reaction) tests and quite lax declarations and
enforcements of emergency. Furthermore, the emergency statement
issued by the Prime Minister Abe on April 7, 2020 was not accompanied
by legal punishments and penalties. It was nothing more than a "please
do, please don’t" plea for restraints about going out and suggestions for
closing shops and restaurants. While enforced lockdown was not
implemented in Japan, most of the Japanese heeded the plea and
followed the suggested guidelines. The Japanese people spontaneously
stayed home from April 8 to May 7, 2020.
The purpose of this Dialogue contribution is to search for
lessons from the Japanese countermeasures against the COVID-19
pandemic. This contribution approaches this issue from a social point of
view. Specifically, it focuses on social understanding process of an
uncertainty event – in this case the COVID-19 pandemic – by the
Japanese. The exploration of this understanding process can reveal
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what the "Japanese Glocal" characteristics are. The discussion starts
with the typical Japanese way of ‘being convinced’.
What follows deals with three topics. The first is a summary of
the typical Japanese attitude toward change of conditions. From this
discussion, we learn that we Japanese are overwhelmingly confident in
our methods when the conditions are stable, but – once conditions
change – we quickly lose our confidence. This rapid, almost radical, shift
of assertions is a peculiarly Japanese way of thinking and reflection. The
first example in the discussion that follows is about the high praise of
Japanese management around 1970s, and the rapid disappearance of
such praise. The second example – of the Japanese attitudes toward
changing conditions – is based on the debate on globalization that took
place in Japan in the 1980s. To the Japanese, globalization initially
represented absolute uncertainty. In the beginning, the Japanese
criticized the emerging globalization conditions and insisted on the
adjustment to these conditions. Next came the counterarguments. Then
– this is important – the Japanese quit the discussions and were
watching what happens next. This is the typical process for the
Japanese to understand the uncertainty of unfolding events.
The third part of this contribution is the discussion and
evaluation of the Japanese attitude and countermeasures against
COVID-19 in 2020. From this discussion, we can glean the "flip-flop"
attitude evident in Japan. This attitude can be characterized as rapid
change of one’s opinions, as if swinging wildly from right to left. This
attitude stems from the ‘unlearning’ habit of Japanese, that we call the
"Japanese Glocal". Finally, this paper concludes that there remain huge
difficulties in learning from Japan’s ‘success’ against COVID-19; and
uncertainties and challenges continue.

Discussions on COVID-19, Deja Vu
This section discusses the general Japanese attitude toward changing
conditions. It illustrates a parallel structure of Japanese attitudes to
changing conditions, which were experienced in the 1970s, and the
present times. The high-praise of Japanese management in that period
resembles the praise for the COVID-19 countermeasures of Japan.
As discussed above, compared to EU countries and United
States, Japan – at least in the first half of 2020 – was recognized as one
of the countries that successfully managed the COVID-19 pandemic.
Therefore, some countries began to explore the Japanese ways. This is
because Japan seems to have responded to COVID-19 better than the
EU and the United States without strict and severe lockdowns, in spite of
Japan's statistics of COVID-19 pandemic – in terms of the cases and
deaths per million – being higher than other Asian countries that had
very strict controls.
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Many varieties of hypotheses about Japan’s relative pandemic
success without strict lockdowns – from the BCG (Bacillus
Calmette-Guérin vaccine, the anti-tuberculosis vaccine, given to babies)
thesis to notions of the Japanese sanitary habits – have been
advanced. The BCG (tuberculosis or TB preventive vaccination) angle
argues that countries with TB cases, and the use of the BCG
vaccination at infancy, have fewer number of COVID-19 deaths
(Shivendu et al. 2020). With regard to the local habits hypothesis, Mr.
Aso of the Ministry of Finance – well-known for his frequent gaffes –
declared that the salutary results regarding the pandemic can be
explained by the ‘highly civilized level’ of Japanese people. His features
of the highly civilized level included spontaneous restraints on going
out, always wearing a mask, washing hands well, gargling, and
removing shoes when entering houses.
When examining the June 2020 situation (of claimed success
against the pandemic), we should recall the kind of discussions the
Japanese had in March 2020, early days of the pandemic. Those
discussions strongly criticized the delayed response by the government,
with warnings of medical system collapse, and praise for the strict and
rigorous lockdowns in foreign countries. In April, Dr. Shibuya, Professor
at Kings College in London, warned that Japan's countermeasures to
COVID-19 were out of step compared to the global standards: he
argued for strict lockdowns, much more intensive PCR testing, and
quick quarantine policies (Shibuya 2020). In general, countermeasures
against COVID-19 in Japan were worse than those in the US, UK,
France, and Germany.
This "flip-flop" attitude is a peculiar characteristic of the
Japanese. Such patterns of attitudes can be seen in many cases. The
most famous one was the attitude toward the Emperor when the World
War II was over. Before January 1, 1946, the Emperor was an avatar of
the Supreme Deity, divinity incarnate in human form. When Japanese
soldiers died in war, these deaths were praised as occurring for the
divine Emperor's sake. On January 1, 1946, the Supreme Commander
of the Allied Powers asked the Showa Emperor, Hirohito, to proclaim
the Humanity Declaration. The Japanese quickly fell in line and
recognized the Emperor as a human.
A similar structure of such attitude flip-flops can be seen in the
1970s – when there was high praise for Japanese management. In
those days, the Japanese had big boosts in confidence because
observers from the United States of America, the victorious country in
World War II, praised Japanese management, with the book Japan as
Number One becoming an icon (Vogel 1979). Before this work, typical
Japanese success stories were characterized by specific management
methods: permanent employment, seniority-wage system, and
enterprise-specific unions (Abegglen 1958). Unlike the prevailing
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discussions about Japanese success, Vogel (1979) attributed and
analyzed Japan's managerial success from a cultural point of view. He
found that the Japanese showed strong will and habits for learning and
reading. Japanese reading habits were twice as strong and prevalent as
those of Americans, evidenced in the large number of bookstores and
high circulation of newspapers in Japan. Going further, Vogel
recommended that Americans can learn from Japanese diligence.
Some of advocates even went so far as to say that – having climbed to
the Number One spot – in Japan, nothing remained to be learned from
America (Morita, Reingold and Shimomura 1986).
Of course, we cannot continue to trace back the discussions of
the contemporary times to the 1970s because the vaunted Japanese
management system was already regarded as having many elements
that retarded Japan’s ability to adjust to global standards in the 1980s
and beyond. Therefore, we need to turn next to discussions about
Japan’s adjustments to globalization.

Discussions on Globalization in Japan
Early in the 1980s, Japan encountered big uncertainty of unfolding
events, in terms of rapid globalization. Not only in business sectors, but
also in public sectors, including education, the Japanese were afraid of
globalization because it would destroy their everyday lives.
During such times and phases, the Japanese often make
arguments that are often polarized to the extreme. In Japan, one side of
the argument regarding globalization was this process as borderless,
and the other and polar side was about globalization with
‘borderfullness’. The border implies many kinds of obstacles, such as
country's own laws, tariffs, trade customs, and non-tariff barriers to
trade; hence borderless economy refers to one with no barriers. In an
extreme case, borderless means that one global regulation covers
world's economic transactions. In contrast, borderfull(ness) implies that
several obstacles remain and interfere with such ideal and smooth,
unfettered economic transactions.
One side in this debate warned that Japanese management
was not diversified, the Japanese decision processes were too slow,
and Japanese regulations put barriers for foreign investors to enter
Japanese markets. Therefore, those Japan-specific customs should be
updated to adjust to the global era (Ohmae 1990).
Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) was the typical example
of this type of discussion. SII began to reduce international trade deficit
of USA in 1989. United States Department of the Treasury recognized
that the closed nature of the Japanese markets caused this huge trade
deficit. This closed nature of Japanese markets was characterized by
complex Japanese trade customs and exclusive, overly elaborate
distribution structure. The US asked Japan to modify these five

https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/mgdr/vol5/iss4/5
DOI: 10.23860/MGDR-2020-05-04-05

4

Takemura: Pandemic Lessons from Japan Glocal

non-tariff barriers to US business sectors: the patterns of financial
saving and investments, taxation of real-estate, commerce and
distribution systems, the exclusive trade customs by reinforcement of
Fair-Trade Commission, tight business relationships, and price
differences between US and Japan. These processes and pressures
can be regarded as attempts to bring borderless globalization to Japan.
In contrast to the foregoing, the argument from the other
extreme criticized the unconditional shift to a borderless globalization
(Itami 1991). This argument insisted that globalization has two aspects:
global distribution of the capital (e.g., money, goods and services, and
information) and movement of human beings and transferring their
habits. The logic of the economy is characterized by movement of the
capital. Due to the development of information and communication
technology, movement of the capital cannot be interrupted by any other
means, except for political reasons. Human beings and their habits,
however, cannot move and transfer at the same pace as capital can.
People in Japan who were afraid of the advancing-invading ‘borderless
globalization’ toward Japan were relieved to hear the alternative of
borderful-globalization because they would not have to change their
customs and habits. As a consequence, the Japanese positively
accepted US goods and services, but retained their cultural habits.
Consider the shopping at the huge US retail chain Walmart as an
example. Walmart entered the Japanese market in 2005, by
establishing a subsidiary. When the Japanese consumers bought huge
packages of food products – such as frozen French fries, spinach, and
broccoli at Walmart – they shared them with neighbors. In other words,
the American habits of buying and storing huge pack-sizes did not
transfer over to Japan.
These are illustrations of the typical structure of the "Japanised"
(and globalized) controversies. Major structural shifts begin a debate
between two extreme positions, then each of these are unlearned soon.
In turn, facts and experiences sublimate and blend the two positions
into one. For instance, in relation to the Japanese management
success mania of the 1970s, the blended position is that Japanese
management sometimes works, but it sometimes fails when the
conditions have changed. In that case, the important thing is to adjust
as often as we can, even without logical consistency. Some Japanese
may call it "aufheben" (to completely cancel, reorient, remove), but it
should rather perhaps be characterized as ephemeralism – or, in
colloquial terms – the ‘Japanese Glocal’.

What Others Can Learn from Japanese Glocal Processes
Concerning the COVID-19 pandemic, the Japanese show attitude
similar to what they had in response to the globalization situation. At
first, we were not afraid of COVID-19. The first case was found on
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January 16, 2020. Around this time, most of Japanese regarded it as
same as flu. Japanese Prime Minister Abe celebrated the Chinese New
Year on January 25 and welcomed the Chinese to Japan. We did
nothing against COVID-19 until February 25, 2020. At that time, Prime
Minister Abe decided the lockdown of schools (elementary and junior
high). Even then, the mass media and most people in Japan stressed
that there was no need to close schools.
The situation, however, drastically changed on March 25, 2020.
The cases in Japan increased precipitately and there was
postponement announcement of the Olympic Games in Tokyo. As the
World Health Organization (WHO) had already declared COVID-19 as a
worldwide pandemic on March 11, 2020, Japanese news media and the
public angrily condemned the delayed (March 25) government
response. Specifically, TV programs and newspapers continued to
loudly criticize the countermeasures by the government in April, 2020,
despite the low level of cases and a small number of deaths, compared
to US and EUs (although, the worst in the East Asia). Those criticisms
included themes like "too late lockdown on April 7,” "increase more and
more PCR testing as soon as possible,” and "legalize and enforce the
lockdown in ways similar to other countries". The media seemed
convinced and acted as if the government was responsible for
everything in this pandemic crisis. Those who took this position cited
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, and New Zealand's success against
COVID-19 as examples. Lockdown was seen as the key factor for
success.
On May 8, 2020, Prime Minister Abe decided to continue the
state of emergency to the end of May. This was the result of some
politicians pandering to above critics. Another "flip-flop" critique began
at this time. News media and members of the public began to criticize
the extension of the emergency state declaration. Additionally, they
argued that "the closures of stores and restaurants without
compensation were wrong,” "no necessity to deliver masks at the high
cost of 436 million USD (USD1.00=JPY110)".
Additional "flip-flop" critique, again, began from mid-April, 2020,
after the first wave peaked out. On June 7, the government announced
that it would provide huge economic support to the travel industry
(transportation, accommodation, and hotel and lodging) because such
sectors had been damaged strongly during "quasi-lockdown". It should
be noted that the constitution of Japan prohibits the restriction of
movement. Therefore, the lockdowns in Japan are always implemented
as if they are based on people's own voluntarily decisions, rather than
on government edicts. The travel-support program was called, "GO
TRAVEL campaign” (and later GO EAT, enjoy EVENTS, and
Neighborhood Shopping Centers were asked to join in). This program
was budgeted at about 15.3 billion USD. This budget would be used
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primarily to offer price discounts to traveling consumers. Travelers could
buy discounted transportation, lodging, and accommodation – up to a
maximum of 35% – and later the government would compensate the
sellers.
Most of negative opinions against the GO TRAVEL approach
insisted the campaign should cease to operate, immediately. One of the
biggest newspapers, Yomiuri Shinbunsha, surveyed public opinions on
July 7, 2020. Their survey showed that 67% people replied that they
would refrain from traveling, and only 15% of the people said they would
plan small trips (e.g., in their own town and city, not across long
distances or international borders).
Despite negative opinions, GO TRAVEL began on July 22,
2020. Many surveys about this campaign have been done. Results
often showed negative attitude against any form of GO TRAVEL, even
though new pandemic cases decreasing drastically before the
campaign. Once the campaign began, the cases rapidly increased and,
by August 7, 2020, reached 1605 per day. This number was the peak in
the second wave. In a later assessment, the Japan Tourism Agency
estimated that a total 52.6 million people used this campaign and the
total amount of subsidy of 3.1 billion USD was given out till the end of
November 2020. The campaign seemed to have achieved enough
success, in spite of many negative opinions.
Though new cases had been decreasing from early August to
middle of October, they started increasing again in October, 2020.
Since October 25, the cases increased rapidly and, by November 14,
reached 1736 per day. Some regional governors concluded that this
was the result of the GO TRAVEL campaign. The campaign was
suspended on December 28, 2020.
What the foregoing discussion shows is that the "flip-flop"
process about public opinions in Japan regarding COVID-19
countermeasures continued throughout 2020: the Chinese New Year,
reactions to WHO pandemic declaration, Olympics postponement, the
voluntary vs. strict lockdown debates, the pro/con of the GO TRAVEL
incentive campaign, and so on.
Interestingly, both sides of discussion always disappeared
soon. For example, against the second wave of COVID-19 pandemic,
some politicians – for instance, the governor of Tokyo, Koike – kept
asking the public to avoid infecting others, still attempting to keep
prohibitions on going out. In general, most of the governors in Japan
started mitigating the restrictions of the declared emergency by June,
2020. Therefore, the famous extreme-crowded-commuters in trains
were back and restaurants and shops reopened. Then, the Japanese
realized that they seemed to be coping with the COVID-19 pandemic
well. And, they believed they would ‘unlearn’ the restrictive COVID-19
pandemic behaviors soon.
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What can we learn from such flip-flop adaptation processes, that
often – to external observers – appear to be funny-appearing
processes, and the Japanese attitudes to major uncertainty producing
events, like COVID-19? Perhaps, the lesson is the quick unlearning and
always occurring adjustments. It can be characterized as momentary
and ephemeral sequences of attitudes.
Such adaptation processes have been commented on as being
parts of the Japanese traditional culture. The book The Chrysanthemum
and the Sword by Ruth Benedict (1946) – heavily criticized for being a
purely desk-research-based book, but also praised nonetheless for
some insights – noted that the Japanese are “both aggressive and
unaggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite,
rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around,
loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to
new ways...” (p. 2).
Kent (1999), a western scholar teaching in Japan (and hence
well-versed in Japanese language and culture), in her review of the
Ruth Benedict book, made two key observations. Kent noted that the
book, despite its ‘armchair research’ limitation, became a way for the
Japanese to discover their own identity. The book, firstly, was regarded
as a report by a researcher from the nation victorious in World War II,
pointing out the peculiarities of (at that time, regarded as
‘under-modernized’) Japan. As the book gained in popularity, much
more in Japan than in the West, another understanding became more
accepted. It became clear that such research (e.g., the Benedict book)
relativized each country's culture, and pointed out that Japan's was not
‘under-modernized’. Indeed, despite the view of being under-modern,
the Japanese found themselves doing very well, in economic and
cultural terms.
Generally, when some external critiques and arguments appear,
the Japanese are initially afraid of these, but then – as a result of such
critiques – often become more intensely aware of (and often more
accepting of) what they are doing. Based on this understanding, the
flip-flop process can be seen as also a manageable approach to adapt
to COVID-19 pandemic crisis.
During the COVID-19 emergency, newspapers, TV channels,
and Social Networking Sites (SNS) said that the best thing we could do
now was to stay home. The Japanese often said, "I do what I can do
now." This attitude stems from the logic-confusion that does not
distinguish between what we can do and what we should do. Logically,
to do "what we should do" comes from a plan, especially from a detailed
plan. In contrast, to do "what we can do, now" comes from a contingent
response to events. The former demands analysis and forecasts about
the future, the latter asks adaptation by the available skills and
adjustments to ongoing events.
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Apparently, Japanese are good at the latter adjustments. During
this pandemic, Japanese have dealt with many trials, such as washing
hands for 30 seconds, wearing masks, gargling, staying home, avoiding
dense, intimate, and close-contact settings, working at home (remote
work or tele-work), and BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin vaccine, the
anti-tuberculosis vaccine, given to babies). Because of these multiple
factors at play, we do not know the true reasons why Japan has coped
with COVID-19 reasonably effectively. In addition, when some of these
measures work, we unlearn what we have done; then, we move on the
next stage. This speed of change is an indigenous characteristic of the
Japanese. If there is something other countries can learn from Japan, it
is to create a new mode of everyday life and adapt to it, rather than
expecting to return to everyday life before COVID-19. Of course, the
pandemic story is ongoing – as is the learning and the unlearning
process from this pandemic.
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